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Natural experiment evidence on whether selection 
bias overstates the gains from migration
Figure 3 shows mean weekly earnings for the different groups.
Earnings in Tonga are converted to New Zealand Dollars at the market 
exchange rate of 1 Pa’anga=0.73 NZD (= 0.53 USD). Results are 
similar using PPP exchange rates calculated from prices we gathered in 
Nuku’alofa and Auckland. The mean earnings for migrants are $424, 
compared to $104 for unsuccessful entrants in the PAC ballot. So the 
simple experimental estimator (equation 1) suggests that migration 
raised earnings by $320 per week. But this estimator does not take 
account of the non-compliers (Group 2). 
Figure 3: Mean weekly earnings (± 1 standard error)
Measuring the gains from increased international migration  requires 
estimating what workers in developing countries could earn in rich 
countries. Immigrants are likely to have different abilities, skills and 
motivations than non-migrants in their home countries making their 
earnings a poor measure of what a randomly selected worker would
earn if they emigrate. Our results show that popular approaches for 
dealing with this selection problem in non-experimental data overstate 
the gains from migration, at least compared with the benchmark of an 
experimental estimate. Thus, assessments of global gains from 
increased international migration are likely to be sensitive to the 
modelling of selectivity bias.
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the New Zealand Department of Labour, or the Government of Tonga. 
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The natural experiment provided by the use of a ballot to admit 
Tongans to New Zealand provides a unique chance to estimate the gain 
in income from migration. Other studies attempt to deal with  selectivity 
issues by using non-experimental methods to compare  the income of 
migrants to those of non-migrants with similar observable 
characteristics. To see how well such methods work in practice, the 
experimental results are compared with those from five non-
experimental methods:
• a single difference estimator which compares migrants’ post-migration 
income to their pre-migration income; 
• OLS regression, which assumes selection on observables; 
• difference-in-differences regression estimation; 
• propensity-score matching; and 
• instrumental variables, using as instruments for migration either the 
pre-existing family network in New Zealand or the pre-migration 
distance from place of residence to the office in Tonga where ballot 
registrations are deposited.
Figure 4 summarizes the non-experimental estimates. Each  non-
experimental method overstates the gains in income from migration 
compared to the experimental estimate. Instrumental variables using a 
good instrument for migration (the distance from the pre-migration 
residence to the office in Tonga where ballots are deposited) performs 
best, only overstating the gains by 11%. But using a poor instrument 
(the size of the family network in New Zealand, which fails the 
exclusion restrictions because the network is also a source of job offers 
and so directly affects the dependent variable) overstates the gains by 
82%.
Figure 4: Non-Experimental Estimates Overstate the
Earnings Gain (± 1 standard error)
The single-difference estimator, which relies on migrants’
retrospectively recalling their pre-migration earnings, overstates the 
gains by 25%. The difference-in-differences estimator compares this 
change in migrants’ earnings with the similarly calculated change in 
non-applicants’ earnings and overstates the gains by 37%. Propensity-
score matching, which uses the characteristics listed in Table 2 to match 
migrants to ‘similar’ non-migrants, overstates the gains by 29%. OLS 
using the same characteristics overstates the gains by 40%.
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Methods
If ballot winners randomly choose to migrate, the income gain from 
migration could be estimated by comparing the mean earnings, Y of 
successful ballots who migrate and unsuccessful ballots (Group 1 vs 3): 
This simple estimate ignores the “dropout bias” from  successful ballots who 
were yet to migrate. But the “intent-to-treat” (ITT) effect, which is the 
earnings difference between all ballot winners (regardless of whether 
migrated) and unsuccessful ballots, 
when divided by the proportion of non-dropouts (33% here) gives an 
unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated. 
Instrumental variables (IV) provide another unbiased method for 
estimating average treatment effects (Angrist, et. al, 1996). The ballot 
outcome is strongly correlated with migration and is a valid instrument 
because randomization (see Table 1) ensures that ballot success is 
uncorrelated with unobserved attributes that might also affect earnings. 
Table 1: Evidence for Randomization 
Five non-experimental methods of estimating the income gain from 
migration are also used. These mainly compare the migrants to the pseudo-
controls in Tonga (Group 4). To ensure the validity of this comparison we 
selected non-applicants from the same villages as either the migrants or the 
unsuccessful ballot entrants. Figure 2 shows how this worked for the main 
island of Tongatapu.
Migration from developing to developed countries and the resulting 
remittance flows are emerging as key development policies. Restrictions on 
international migration may have larger welfare costs than the more widely 
studied restrictions on international trade (World Bank, 2005). 
Measuring the gains from migration requires estimating what workers in 
developing countries could earn in rich countries. These estimates may be 
affected by selection bias, with differences in earnings for migrants and non-
migrants reflecting unobserved differences in ability, skills, and motivation, 
rather than the act of moving itself. 
We use a unique random selection mechanism to overcome this selection 
problem. This mechanism is based on the Pacific Access Category (PAC) 
under New Zealand’s immigration policy. The PAC allows a quota of about 
70 Tongan families to immigrate each year, with a ballot used to choose 
amongst the excess number of applicants. Comparing ballot winners and 
losers provides the only known experimental measure of the income gains 
from migration. 
A sample of non-applicants is then compared to the migrant sample to 
assess whether typically used non-experimental methods provide reliable 
estimates of the income gains from migration. 
Detailed surveys of four random samples of Tongan households were 
conducted by the authors in 2005:
1) 65 migrant households who came to New Zealand through the 2002/03 
and 2003/04 PAC ballots (a 70% sampling rate)
2) 55 households whose members had successful ballots but who had not 
yet migrated to New Zealand – these are non-compliers to the migration 
“treatment” (a 30% sampling rate)
3) 78 households with unsuccessful ballots who were still in Tonga (a 3% 
sampling rate), and
4) 60 households in Tonga who had never entered the migration ballot and 
who were living in the same villages as the successful and unsuccessful 
PAC applicants (a 1% sampling rate).
Figure 1 shows the relationship between these four samples and the PAC 
immigration program. 
Figure 1: The immigration ballot and the four household samples
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Comparing ballot winners (Groups 1 and 2) and ballot losers gives the 
intent to treat effect (equation 2): ITT=$(194-104)=$90. A successful 
ballot raises expected earnings by $90 per week. Column (1) of Table 2 
reports the same result from a simple OLS regression model using a 
dummy variable for success in the ballot.
Adjusting this ITT for non-compliance, migration is estimated to have 
raised the weekly earnings of Tongans by $274. The same estimate
comes from using the lottery outcome as an instrument for migration, 
shown in column (3) of Table 2.
Columns (2) and (4) add controls for pre-existing characteristics to the 
regression models. Adding age, sex, marital status, school years, height 
(as a measure of health), being born on the main island of Tongatapu (a 
proxy for having more urban skills), and past income only marginally 
changes the estimated intent-to-treat effect, from $91 to $87, and does 
not change the treatment effect on the treated. This invariance of the 
estimated program effects is consistent with Table 1, which shows the 
randomization across the successful and unsuccessful ballots.
Table 2: OLS and IV Regression Equations for Weekly Earnings (NZD)
Given that mean income of applicants with unsuccessful ballots is 
$104, these results indicate that Tongans experience a 263% increase in 
weekly labour income from migrating to New Zealand. 
Notes
Angrist, J.D., G.W. Imbens and D.B. Rubin (1996) “Identification of Causal Effects  
Using Instrumental Variables”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434): 
444-455.
World Bank (2005) Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances 
and Migration World Bank Group, Washington DC.  
1Corresponding author: jkgibson@waikato.ac.nz
Group 
4
Enter ballot or not?
Successful ballot?
Migrate or not?
Group 3
Group 2Group 1
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Ballot Success Dummy 90.634  87.390  
(3.68)** (3.89)**
Male Dummy -23.855  -27.772  
(1.08)  (1.33)  
Married Dummy 24.535  18.376  
(1.05)  (0.82)  
Age Dummy -0.886  -0.462  
(0.71)  (0.41)  
Years of Education 4.605  3.274  
(1.18)  (0.91)  
Born on Tongatapu Dummy 27.600  28.005  
(1.87)  (2.04)* 
Height 0.381  0.353  
(0.92)  (0.93)  
Past income 0.662  0.660  
(6.98)** (7.31)**
Migration Dummy 273.996  273.736  
(4.46)** (4.99)**
Constant 104.051  -60.422  104.051  -48.595  
(8.85)** (0.74)  (8.90)** (0.66)  
First stage F-statistic on instrument 66.53  61.51
Observations 197 190 197 190
R-squared 0.04 0.27
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Experimental estimate [% overstatement] **sig level
Single-difference using pre-migration income [24.6]
Selection on observables: OLS regression [40.0]**
Difference in difference regression [36.9]**
Propensity score matching [28.5]*
IV using migrant network in New Zealand [82.0]
IV using distance to ballot office [11.3]
T-test
of equality
Successful Unsuccessful of means
Ballots Ballots  p-value
Age 33.6 33.7 0.91
Years of schooling 11.9 11.5 0.37
Proportion male 0.55 0.51 0.52
Proportion born on Tongatapu 0.75 0.79 0.54
Proportion who are married 0.60 0.62 0.77
Height 171.6 169.3 0.16
Income in 2003 / before moving 103.7 88.0 0.32
Total Sampl  Size 120 78
Sample Means
APPLICANTS
Group 4
